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6
Effi cient and Effective Economic 
Regulation in a Confusing 
Technological Environment
Michael J. Piore
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
This chapter focuses on the role of government in a market econ-
omy and the balance between government regulation and the “free” 
market. I examine this problem through the lens of several research 
projects in which I have recently been engaged, particularly a project on 
alternative approaches to the administration of labor standards, but also 
several studies in a very different domain—the organization of product 
design and product development. I hope, however, to make clear the 
relationship between these disparate activities. And, indeed, an impor-
tant part of my goal in this chapter is to widen the lens through which 
we think about economic activity. 
The debate about the market and the role of government in its regu-
lation is an old one, stretching back to the Industrial Revolution at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century (Polanyi 1944). But the contem-
porary variant is really rooted in the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
The Great Depression was widely viewed as the product of an unregu-
lated market economy run amok, and most of the regulatory institu-
tions debated today are a product of the reaction to the unregulated 
market in that period. In the interim, between the origins of these insti-
tutions in the 1930s and the debate today, opinion on the need for them 
has oscillated back and forth in what Polanyi, writing at the beginning 
of the period but looking back at industrial history, calls the “double 
movement.” The prosperity of the immediate postwar period as medi-
ated by the institutions of the 1930s seemed to vindicate the regulatory 
movement. The stagnation of the 1970s produced a reaction, not simply 
against regulation but against government in general, and with the elec-
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tion of Ronald Reagan in 1980 a process of deregulation was initiated 
that continued through the next 30 years. One can in fact argue that the 
process of deregulation had begun even earlier in telecommunications 
and the airlines, but it was at fi rst focused on those particular industries 
and not on economic regulation more broadly. Following the fi nancial 
crisis of 2008, the pendulum started to swing back in the other direction. 
There was a widely shared perception that deregulation had gone too 
far, a renewed appreciation that the market operates within an institu-
tional framework created by government and managed by government 
agencies, and a recognition that the failure to maintain this framework 
makes the society vulnerable to a variety of excesses and abuses. In this 
sense, there is agreement about the need for some regulation. But there 
is nothing like a consensus about what that framework of regulation 
should look like.
REGULATION IN THE LABOR MARKET 
But while the emphasis in the debate has oscillated widely with 
changes in the economic environment over the course of the postwar 
period, the underlying arguments for and against regulation have not 
varied. The case in favor of the unregulated market is that it leaves 
prices free to refl ect relative scarcity, and it places businesses under 
competitive pressure to pick the most effi cient way to use limited 
resources. Regulation introduces rigidities, which interfere with these 
adjustment mechanisms (Hayek 1948). In so doing, it limits the ability 
of the economy to respond to variations in supply and demand, varia-
tions that occur for numerous reasons that cannot be anticipated. These 
variations are occasioned in the short run by accidents of weather, sud-
den changes in tastes, or the misfortunes of particular businesses or sec-
tors; in the intermediate run they are produced by the ebb and fl ow of 
economic activity over the business cycle; and in the long run by tech-
nological changes that render older approaches obsolete and require 
the constant accommodation and adjustment of business practices and 
institutional structures.
In the case of work regulation, the argument is that it leads to rigidi-
ties in wages and in employment obligations in general, and that these 
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rigidities in turn lead to the ineffi cient deployment of labor and spe-
cifi cally to unemployment. These effects are especially strong at the 
bottom of the labor market, where the regulations are binding; hence, 
regulation will distort the income distribution. These basic concerns 
have been compounded in recent years by the belief that new technolo-
gies and expanding global competition have so changed the economic 
environment that the particular regulations that were developed in the 
1930s are outdated and, in some versions, irrelevant (Weil 2014).
Forms of Work Regulation
The image of work regulation that underlies this argument is, how-
ever, derived from the administrative system that is characteristic of 
the United States, and that system is far from universal. An alternative 
administrative approach (and one that is a good deal more fl exible) is 
found in France, most of southern Europe, and Latin America—what 
I will call in this chapter the Franco-Latin system. The contrast offers 
a very different perspective on regulation, one in which regulations 
can work along with market forces and not necessarily against them. 
The contrast here is between a specialized sanctioning system (as it is 
termed in the shorthand vocabulary used by the International Labour 
Organization) and a general compliance one (von Richthofen 2002).
The U.S. system is specialized and sanctioning. Work regulations 
are spread out over almost a dozen different federal agencies: the Wages 
and Hours Division of the Department of Labor, the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), several agencies that deal with 
immigration, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the Federal 
Mediation Service, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC), and so on. Many of these federal agencies have analogues at 
the state level which share the same territory. Each agency thus has a 
narrow jurisdiction and a limited mandate. It specializes in and focuses 
upon that dimension of work with which it is directly concerned. The 
underlying model of enforcement and compliance is one of deterrence 
through sanctions. Violations of regulations are penalized—usually 
through a fi ne, much more rarely through a prison sentence. The penalty 
basically discharges the obligation of the enterprise, and the penalty also 
serves in theory as a deterrent to violation. The size of the penalty and 
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the probability of discovering a violation through complaints or inspec-
tions determine the incentive to comply with the law. When compliance 
is inadequate, these can be adjusted accordingly, either by raising the 
fi ne (also by possibly increasing the prison sentence) or by increasing 
the chances of getting caught—by, for example, increasing the number 
of inspectors. The level of fi nes and the number of inspectors are the 
basic parameters which control the effectiveness of the system.
The Franco-Latin system of work regulation is by contrast built on a 
general conciliation/remediation model (Piore and Schrank 2006, 2008; 
Schrank and Piore 2007). The model is general in the sense that the 
whole of the labor code is administered by a single organization. The 
line agents of that organization (the labor inspectors), when they enter 
a given enterprise, can cite the organization for violations of any part of 
the code. But more basically, the employer cannot discharge his or her 
obligations by payment of a penalty alone. Employers are supposed to 
come into compliance with the law. The role of the inspector is to help 
them do so. Toward that end, the inspector is empowered to develop a 
plan that corrects violations of the law—if necessary, through reforms 
in technology and managerial practice. He or she also has the power 
to grant the enterprise the space to implement these reforms gradually 
over time. 
The system gives the inspectors wide discretion in how the regula-
tions are actually administered. The discretion derives from the very 
wide variety of provisions of the law over which the inspector has juris-
diction. He or she could not possibly inspect for every one of these pro-
visions and hence must pick and choose those provisions upon which 
to focus. The ability of the inspector to institute a plan that brings about 
compliance gradually over time further expands that inspector’s effec-
tive powers and discretion. In sum, the capacity for the inspector to 
adapt the rules and regulations in this way gives the system a potential 
fl exibility to adjust to the peculiarities of particular enterprises and to 
the economic and social environment in which they operate—a poten-
tial that the U.S. system completely lacks. The inspector can, in effect, 
focus on health and safety violations when unemployment is low and 
alternative jobs are readily available if the enterprise has trouble bear-
ing the cost of correcting these, but he or she can look the other way 
when unemployment is high and the competitive environment in which 
the fi rm is operating is tight. Similarly, the inspector can enforce wage 
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laws less stringently when unemployment is high and the market pres-
sures would normally lead to lower wages. 
But additionally, and signifi cantly, the emphasis on compliance 
should lead the inspector to look for the underlying causes of the viola-
tions and seek remedies in managerial practice or technology that actu-
ally address the problem at its root. In this way, the system encourages 
inspectors to look for support from other government programs that 
address these problems, such as manufacturing extension programs 
or employment and training. The U.S. system, by contrast, leads the 
inspectors to focus narrowly on what are, in effect, symptoms of the 
way the company does business. It is like the difference between a doc-
tor focusing on the symptoms and one focusing on the disease. 
Whether or not the labor inspection system actually exhibits this 
kind of fl exibility depends on how the inspectors make their deci-
sions and how the system is managed. Interviews with inspectors in 
France, Spain, and Latin America suggest that they are best understood 
as “street-level” bureaucrats. They belong to a class of public servants 
who work in organizations where substantial discretion is lodged in 
the agents at the bottom of the organizational hierarchy (Lipsky 1980). 
Organizations of this kind that have been studied in the academic lit-
erature include social workers, classroom teachers, and forest rangers. 
But they also include civil servants whose power and discretion is not 
generally recognized, such as immigration agents or program auditors 
(Piore 2011).
 The canonical street-level bureaucrat is the police patrolman on the 
beat (Wilson 1968). In principle, the police are charged with enforcing 
the law. But in fact much of police work is really about maintaining 
social order. The law becomes an instrument in the pursuit of order 
and is evoked situationally. Social order, moreover, is an ambiguous 
concept that is dependent on context and varies with the moral code of 
the community. Thus, technically, prostitution is illegal at all times and 
in all places, and prostitutes in middle-class, suburban neighborhoods 
will be arrested on sight, but de facto prostitution is generally tolerated 
in the downtown entertainment districts of most large cities. 
How do street-level bureaucrats make these decisions? In some 
part, these decisions are idiosyncratic; each agent has his or her own 
moral code. But in most such organizations, when the agents work with 
each other for a prolonged period, they develop a common code of 
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behavior. The agents come to judge each other by the degree to which 
their actions conform to that code, and agents themselves seek to act in 
conformity with the code because they value the opinions of their col-
leagues; their own sense of self-worth is bound up with the judgment of 
the group. The code of behavior that governs their decisions is some-
thing like a language—a simile to which we will return below—and, 
like a language, it evolves through use. But the code also refl ects a set of 
values that new recruits bring with them to the job, as these values are 
refracted through the process of training and socialization to which the 
recruits are subject once they are selected to join the organization. And 
the code then evolves over time through continual interaction among 
members of the organization as they discuss cases, particularly new and 
unusual cases. Those discussions proceed continually and informally 
through employees’ interacting on the job or relating “war stories” as 
they socialize with each other on breaks in the work routine or while 
relaxing together after work. In some organizations, these discussions 
are formalized in group meetings with higher levels of management, 
where the priorities of the organizations are presented and confl icts 
among organizational goals are debated and resolved.
The behavior of street-level bureaucrats can be contrasted to two 
other models that dominate discussions of organizational behavior. One 
is the economist’s model of self-interested rational choice—ideally, in 
a market economy, constrained by the “prices” generated by the inter-
action of the actors in competition with each other. The agents in a 
street-level bureaucracy are not less self-interested than in the econo-
mist’s formulation, but their interest is centered on the judgment of their 
colleagues. Their prestige in their own mind is dependent on how their 
fellow workers perceive their work. The new public management is an 
attempt to simulate the market by identifying quantitative measures of 
organizational goals and rewarding the agents in accordance with their 
achievements. One can think of this approach as trying to substitute 
monetary rewards for the judgment of peers. It fails in part because col-
legial approval is not fungible and cannot be reduced to monetary com-
pensation. The model also fails in street-level bureaucracies because 
the objectives that measure what the organization is trying to achieve 
are too numerous and complex to be reduced to quantitative measures, 
and the weights attached to the different goals vary too widely with the 
economic and social environment. How do you measure the effective-
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ness of the police? Is it by the amount of crime? And if so what kinds 
of crime? Or is it by the sense of an orderly community? Or a feeling 
of safety they engender in the citizenry? And if the last, how do you 
weigh the concerns of the different citizens? How do you compare the 
white woman’s fear of the black teenager in the ghetto to the sense of 
insecurity and the humiliation felt by those teenagers when subjected to 
continual police “stop and frisk” encounters?
The alternative to the market in the conventional formulation is a 
classic Weberian bureaucracy, where the agents are instructed in how 
to behave by directives from above and are punished when they fail to 
comply. Such bureaucratic regulations produce precisely the rigidities 
that are the subject of the conventional critique of regulation (Crozier 
1964). The higher-level directives do not adjust—or do not adjust fast 
enough—to the fl ux and uncertainties of a market economy or to the 
peculiarities of particular enterprises and the socioeconomic environ-
ments in which they are operating. They end up, for example, treating 
an enterprise in temporary distress because of accidents of nature or of 
the market in the same way as a fi rm that seeks a competitive advantage 
by exploiting its workforce and violating the protective rules and regu-
lations. They apply the same regulations in regions with high unem-
ployment and in regions with very tight labor markets that can afford to 
lose the jobs that a strict enforcement of health and safety regulations or 
of wages and hours laws might imply would be lost.
But while street-level bureaucracies do not lend themselves to 
either hierarchical control or to management through simulated mar-
ket incentives, the social environment that governs the decisions the 
agents make can be “managed” (Piore 2011). The organization actually 
possesses a number of instruments for doing so. For convenience, we 
would group these instruments under four headings. First, management 
controls the processes of recruitment and selection of new candidates, 
and hence the values that new agents bring with them when they enter 
the service. In the case of labor inspectors, the social codes seem espe-
cially susceptible to the mix of candidates from working-class families 
relative to those from middle-class backgrounds more sympathetic to 
business; other dimensions stressed in our fi eld interviews with labor 
inspectors include the mix between lawyers, engineers, medical doc-
tors, union offi cials, ex-military, and women versus men. 
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Second, management controls the processes of socialization and 
training once the new recruits enter the service. The mix between for-
mal training on the one hand and apprenticeship on the other is espe-
cially important. In the latter, new recruits are sent out into the fi eld with 
experienced inspectors, and in this way values and behavioral patterns 
are passed on directly from one generation to another. Apprenticeship 
also emphasizes tacit knowledge. Formal training, on the other hand, 
can stress or counteract the biases introduced in the recruiting process 
by emphasizing explicit, formal criteria of evaluation.
A third range of variables that management controls is that of how 
self-contained the organization is, how open it is to outside infl uences 
and values, and how dependent upon the judgment of their colleagues 
the agents actually are relative to other groups in society with whom 
they interact. At one extreme in this regard is the military, whose mem-
bers typically live and work in closed environments, with their own 
recreational facilities, medical care facilities, schools for their children, 
etc. This environment insulates military personnel from outside contacts 
that might compete with military values in judging their self-worth. In 
addition, members of military organizations become dependent on their 
colleagues not only for social validation but for physical protection in 
hostile environments, thus reinforcing their concern with the approval 
and support of their colleagues. This is true of police work as well. 
The balance between the support that line offi cers receive from their 
colleagues versus that offered by their supervisors in dangerous situa-
tions is also an important variable in determining how much infl uence 
the latter can exert over the decisions of their subordinates. Actually, in 
some environments, it is also true of labor inspectors. In France several 
years ago, two labor inspectors were shot dead by an irate farmer whose 
premises they were inspecting, and the failure of the government to 
speak out forcefully condemning the killings has colored the relation-
ship between the line inspectors and their supervisors ever since.
The fourth way—and in many regards the most interesting way—
in which management can exert infl uence over the decisions of street-
level bureaucrats is through the ongoing conversation surrounding the 
regulation process. My own sense of the importance of this conversa-
tion and what it means to “manage” it actually comes from a series of 
studies on product design and development, studies of what might be 
termed, in a very loose sense, “innovation.” Conventional economics 
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does not yield a clear theory of “innovation.” It deals primarily with 
how choices are made among a known set of alternative technologies. 
The properties of such technologies may not be known with certainty, 
but they are assumed to be suffi ciently well identifi ed that one can 
assign probabilities or expectations to key characteristics and then work 
to develop the characteristics of the alternatives so as to minimize their 
costs or maximize their contribution to a specifi ed set of goals. But new 
product development often involves radical uncertainty (Knightian 
uncertainty) of choices in a situation where one does not even know 
what the alternatives really are. 
Among the products that emerged in our own studies, the canoni-
cal case is the cellular telephone (Lester and Piore 2004). The cellular 
phone is a combination of radio and telephone technologies, inspired by 
the two-way radios used by police and by taxis. The fi rst such devices 
were bulky car-mounted instruments. People had only the vaguest idea 
of why one might want one or how they might be used. The device had 
to be developed to be commercially viable, but none of the developers 
knew exactly what he or she was developing. In addition, the radio and 
telephone companies that had to cooperate to work out the mechanics 
of the device were from completely different engineering and business 
cultures. Telephony had a tradition of quality engineering, of making 
almost perfect products, sold to expert customers. Emblematic of the 
ethos of the industry was the fact that the dial tone was always there 
when you picked up the phone, and calls were virtually never lost. Radio 
engineers were by comparison cowboys; they understood the technol-
ogy empirically; they accepted a reality in which the signal faded in and 
out and failure was corrected on an ad hoc basis. Radios were produced 
by large, expert companies, but they were sold to consumers for whom 
the product was ancillary to their main concerns. 
How did these two antagonistic business and engineering cultures 
learn to work together? How did the product they produced evolve 
from a clunky car radio to a perfectly portable instrument that people 
carried around in their pockets and to which were attached a range of 
functions that included not only two-way vocal communication but an 
ever-expanding list of other capabilities, from video games and written 
messages to still and video photography? 
The cellular phone as it exists today emerged out of what I term in 
my organizational research an ongoing conversation—a conversation 
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not only among the disparate engineers and managers who ultimately 
had to collaborate to produce the new product, but also between the 
producers and the consumers who would ultimately purchase and use 
it. The conversation proceeded in two phases. In the fi rst phase, the par-
ticipants were basically developing a common language in which they 
could understand each other and could tolerate and ultimately appreci-
ate their differences. In the second phase, they used the new language 
to discuss various ideas as to how the product they were developing 
might be used. We called this process interpretative; it was open-ended 
and did not involve commitment to any particular model or design. Out 
of this ongoing interpretative conversation, at various points in time, 
particular product ideas were selected. These were then developed in 
a totally different process, an analytical process in which the engineers 
sought the optimal design. But it was the interpretative process through 
which they handled the radical uncertainty involved in the creation of a 
totally new product.
We came to think of that interpretative process as being like a cock-
tail party. Like guests at a party, the engineers and managers engaged 
in seemingly idle conversation, moving back and forth from what we 
would classify in a rational choice framework as ends (what is the “thing” 
good for? how will it be used?) and means (how could it be powered if 
we move it out of the car? what kinds of material would make it light 
enough to be carried but durable enough to withstand being banged 
around in a pocket or purse?). The role of the manager in this process 
then becomes like that of a host at a party: invite the guests, introduce 
them to each other, stimulate conversation among them, break up con-
versations that become too antagonistic, and introduce new guests to 
conversations that seem to be becoming stale and repetitive—making 
sure at all times that the discussions are moving forward, that the guests 
are engaged, that new perspectives are emerging.
A parallel set of conclusions are emerging in a series of studies of 
federal agencies that fund research and development with which I am 
currently involved. The agency that is closest to the innovative fron-
tier, generating new products continuously, is DARPA (the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency). Since its creation in 1958 in 
response to the surprise launching of the Soviet space satellite Sputnik, 
DARPA has been key in the creation of a wide array of revolution-
ary technologies, from the World Wide Web, the cellular phone, and a 
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host of new materials, to more narrowly military technologies such as 
the stealth bomber. Other major federal agencies funding research—the 
National Science Foundation, for example, or the National Institutes 
of Health—select projects and allocate funds through a peer review 
process. DARPA projects, by contrast, are created and managed by a 
project manager. The project manager has wide discretion to pick the 
particular area and type of technology that he or she is going to develop 
and the process through which that development is going to take place. 
The process that the DARPA program manager uses to do this paral-
lels the process that emerged in our case studies in design and product 
development (Fuchs 2010).
The process begins with an often vague idea of a new technology—
usually with some potential military application—but often an applica-
tion that is so ill-defi ned that one might think of it as an excuse rather 
than a target. The project manager then seeks to identify industries and 
areas of science and technology that might contribute in one way or 
another to the development of the idea, very often fi nding people who 
are strangers to one another and who in the normal course of events 
might never communicate—not unlike the radio and the telephone 
engineers who were brought together to create the cellular phone. These 
potential collaborators, once identifi ed, are brought together in informal 
meetings, seminars, and conferences to discuss the project and their 
potential contribution to it. Only after this discussion has proceeded 
to the point where these people have, fi rst, developed a common lan-
guage and, second, worked together to identify specifi c technological 
issues that must be addressed does the project manager formulate a set 
of research tasks and issue requests for proposals (RFPs). Most nota-
bly, at DARPA the discussions surrounding the project continue even as 
specifi c research is taking place. The agency as a whole, and the project 
managers individually, are forever convening seminars and colloquia 
in which the contractors are required to present their results to each 
other and review and comment on the work of their colleagues. In this 
way, an open-ended interpretative conversation is always ongoing in 
the background, however specifi c, narrowly focused, and goal-oriented 
the research itself becomes. 
How does this understanding of innovation map onto the Franco-
Latin work inspectors or to street-level bureaucrats more broadly? The 
street-level bureaucrats have been variously described as “the refl ective 
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practitioner” (Schön 1983) or “the sociological citizens” (Silbey 2011). 
At its best, their task is to craft solutions to the particulars of each case. 
The DARPA project manager is in this sense a street-level bureaucrat. 
Or, the other way around, each work inspector becomes an innovator, 
and each case that he or she handles becomes like an innovation. The 
material out of which that innovation is constructed—the substance but 
also the practice—is drawn out of the ongoing conversation occurring 
in the background of the work process. And one can imagine manage-
ment in a street-level bureaucracy managing the conversation in much 
the same way as product-development managers in private industry or 
the project manager at DARPA: like a host at a cocktail party. The sin-
gular exception is that, in most cases, when the manager arrives on 
the scene, the cocktail party is already in process—a conversation is 
already ongoing among the agents; the work group has already devel-
oped a language and vocabulary in which they are accustomed to talk 
to each other. 
Finally, the analogue to innovation is not limited to day-to-day 
operations; there are often cases that are quite literally innovative 
situations, where the problem is fundamentally different from those 
that have arisen before, and where even experienced inspectors lack 
a vocabulary for defi ning what the underlying problem is and how to 
address it. Where this is the case, the analogy to the DARPA project 
manager is even stronger. This is especially true at the current moment, 
in which the advent of information technology, new forms of commu-
nication and transport, and new global trading regimes make existing 
work regulations appear anachronistic. 
The interpretive conversation among street-level bureaucrats—and 
in our case labor inspectors in the Franco-Latin model—goes on spon-
taneously, often informally, in the background of day-to-day life in the 
organization as the agents go about their work. And one can say that 
the solutions they fashion to the problems they encounter are drawn 
out of this ongoing conversation in the same way that the succession 
of cellular telephone models are drawn out of the interpretive conver-
sation among managers and engineers. But that conversation can also 
become a tool that management can organize and direct by playing the 
host at the cocktail party—convening formal meetings, inviting outside 
experts to participate and interact with the front-line agents, introduc-
ing particular topics that would not otherwise be discussed or, at least, 
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made the explicit focus of the conversation, even supporting academic 
research on different forms of work organization, technical processes, 
and business strategies that could inform the discussion.
 It is admittedly hard to imagine the United States adopting the 
Franco-Latin model of work regulation. The current state of labor mar-
ket regulation favors the power of business, and the alignment of politi-
cal forces favors the status quo. One could imagine a greater coordina-
tion among the various agencies but not a wholesale reform that would 
create a unifi ed system. But in other regulatory arenas, the U.S. system 
is more unifi ed, and the agents of the regulatory agencies operate with 
considerable discretion, much like a street-level bureaucracy. Examples 
include public prosecutors’ offi ces at both the state and the national lev-
els (Chattin 1996; Misner 1996), the Forest Service (USDA 2002), drug 
and medical device regulation (Carpenter 2010), and energy.
Paradoxically, the regulatory domain that in the United States is 
closest to work regulation is fi nance. Here too, regulatory authority is 
dispersed among numerous federal organizations and in many areas 
is shared with the states as well. Here too, as well, there has been an 
intense debate about the relevance of the regulations initially conceived 
in the 1930s for the contemporary economy. But a major difference 
between fi nance and work regulation is that, despite the dispersion in 
fi nance, there is a single agency that oversees the sector as a whole: 
the Federal Reserve. The Fed may not have the power to coordinate 
the regulatory structure through administrative directives outside its 
own jurisdiction, but it does animate a debate, an interpretative con-
versation, that resonates throughout the sector and the many agencies 
that impinge upon it. This conversation concerns the goals of fi nancial 
regulation, the “means” or instruments available to achieve those goals, 
and the relative weights to be assigned to alternative, possibly compet-
ing goals, explicitly weighing full employment, price stability, and risk 
management against each other and adjusting the balance among them 
over the business cycle.
The fi nancial service sector and the Fed’s role in managing the ongo-
ing conversation within it in recent years is, however, a cautionary tale 
(Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). As chairman of the Fed, Alan Greenspan 
argued that new technologies had rendered obsolete the regulatory 
structures of the past, and the discussion under his leadership and direc-
tion completely failed to anticipate the fi nancial crisis of 2008. It failed 
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to do so, I believe, because the people invited to the “cocktail party” 
came from too narrow a segment of society. But the point here is less 
the particular failings of the past than the recognition of the importance 
of the ongoing conversation and the way it is organized as a critical 
instrument of public policy in a dynamic but also uncertain economy 
(Bernanke 2015).
CONCLUSION
This chapter’s discussion of regulation has extended well beyond 
typical economics discussions of this topic. Why is this the case? Eco-
nomics is virtually alone among the social sciences in taking as its mis-
sion not only to develop a better understanding of the world but, through 
that understanding, to better human welfare within it.  In that mission 
we have in recent years failed—and by some measures failed miserably, 
at enormous cost to human life and welfare, both individual and social. 
In work regulation, the most conspicuous failure is represented by the 
factory building collapse in Bangladesh in 2013, the worst industrial 
accident in history. Over 1,000 workers died in a factory producing 
goods for the U.S. market, commissioned by and later sold under U.S. 
brand-name fi rms competing in market conditions created by the abrupt 
end of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement, which regulated worldwide trade 
in textiles and clothing from 1974 to 2004. The United States promoted 
the end of this agreement as part of a policy of globalization, designed 
and supported by the backing of virtually the whole of the economics 
profession. The building collapse was preceded by a factory fi re that 
was in many ways a replica of the New York City Triangle Shirtwaist 
fi re 100 years earlier, which we in the economics profession believed 
had taught the lessons of the dangers of unregulated work in the garment 
industry and how to prevent such dangers (Bhasin 2014). In the United 
States itself, we have just lived through the worst fi nancial crisis since 
the Great Depression and barely averted a comparable crisis in the real 
economy.  With very few exceptions, the profession failed to anticipate 
the crisis and, as just noted, promoted the elimination of regulations 
that might have moderated it or even prevented it. And we addressed 
the crisis by subsidizing a long list of major companies in fi nance and 
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manufacturing, while letting a host of rank-and-fi le workers go bank-
rupt, which meant they lost their housing and lifetime savings (Mian 
and Sufi  2014). We are now left with a legacy of unemployment and 
economic insecurity that is probably more acute than at any other time 
in the postwar period.  All of this after four decades of slow economic 
growth in which average incomes have stagnated while earnings at the 
very top of the distribution have been allowed to rise progressively, so 
that the chief executives of major corporations (the kinds of major cor-
porations that were the benefi ciaries of the fi nancial bailout) have risen 
from 40 times the incomes of the average employee to 250–300 times 
(Mishel et al. 2012). 
Economics has created a framework that is designed to speak 
directly to public policy, but the analytical apparatus that we have 
brought to bear within that framework is inadequate to the problems 
we have set out to solve. We need a broader-based analysis, a broader 
understanding, fi rst of human motivation and behavior and second of 
how knowledge develops and evolves in an uncertain world. I have 
tried here to point out instances of other social sciences from which 
those understandings might come, and how they might be applied to the 
formulation of public policy. I believe that that is the task economists 
face today. The basic lesson that emerges from the examination of the 
Franco-Latin model of work regulation, then, is that we need to turn 
much more deliberately and self-consciously to the question of how 
to manage that discretion, to understand the sociology of such regula-
tory systems, and to draw from sociology in a more self-conscious and 
deliberate way to develop and deploy the instruments’ potential in such 
systems for supplementing the market to overcome some of the limits 
of a market economy. 
Note
The argument of this chapter was developed in collaboration with Andrew Schrank and 
is presented in detail in our forthcoming book Root Cause Regulation.
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